I. Introduction

A. Some Questions, and the Intent of This Paper

The current economic crisis has arguably brought about at least one very positive result for the world; It has drawn attention away from trade disputes and criticism of certain countries‘ trade policies as protectionist or otherwise unfair. Indeed, some of the world‘s largest economies have reduced barriers to trade in hopes of encouraging international trade during these difficult economic times. Nevertheless, economic recovery will undoubtedly bring new trade disputes – perhaps even more intense than those of the past – as the nations of the world struggle to gain or regain strong economic positions in the modern world order.

In this context, China has become one of the most important trading nations in the world; perhaps the most important trader of goods in the world. Indeed China will likely recover from the current economic crisis sooner than any other major nation. Therefore, we might all look to China as the nation most likely to bring the rest of the world out of the economic crisis as well.

However, notwithstanding all the good it has done and will undoubtedly continue to do, China still receives a great deal of criticism from the rest of the world regarding its trade policies and progress with respect to its WTO commitments. Does any merit exist with respect to such complaints? Given recent world events, should we look to China‘s successes for guidance when re-thinking how we perceive the trade regime developed under the WTO?

Consider some of the most frequent criticisms as China as a powerful trading nation, and how politicians and academics frame them: What "improper" import calculation techniques has China adopted in order to employ antidumping measures pursuant to World Trade Organization ("WTO") rules? How have China's domestic laws and policies contributed to its ability to "skew calculations" in its favor in order to employ antidumping measures? How did China choose those methods; did the methods originate in long-standing Chinese policy, or has China emulated similar methods used by the U.S., the EU and other countries?

To many readers, the above questions will seem like a reasonable place to begin exploring whether China has misused the WTO to employ antidumping measures. However, those questions rely heavily on several assumptions that informed scholars should consider before or while examining the questions themselves. For example, consider the following: Notwithstanding political protests of the U.S. Congress and U.S. lobbyists, has China fulfilled the commitments it made upon entering the WTO in 2001? Has China made its antidumping and other systems transparent enough for anyone to make a meaningful judgment with respect to the legality of many of its actions? If China has not become fully compliant with those commitments, has China moved toward greater compliance, or greater noncompliance, with its commitments? To what extent do China‘s 'bad' policies harm or help the world economy and impede or foster fair trade? In addition to whether China‘s policies originated within China or as emulations of other countries‘ policies, why has China adopted such policies? What special features of China as a nation and as a global economic player have contributed to its policy development?

This paper will not venture to answer all, or even most, of these questions. Thorough exploration of all of the above questions would require volumes. This paper will explore what we do know about China and antidumping. It will also examine some aspects of the extent to which China has become compliant with WTO antidumping policies and procedures, and point out some often forgotten facts and factors that trade scholars and China scholars should keep in mind in their own examination of China‘s antidumping and other policies.

B. Overview

Between January 1, 1995 and June 30, 2007, WTO members initiated more than twice as many antidumping challenges against the People‘s Republic of China ("China") as against any other country. Even during its last double-digit economic growth year before the economic crisis, China remained the most frequent subject of the new investigations. However, in 2002, only its second year in the WTO, China also already ranked third in antidumping initiations; behind only India and the United States. Today China remains one of the most frequent antidumping initiation notifying WTO Members. Does this use of the WTO mechanism indicate China has become more compliant with WTO rules? Does it mean the rest of the world has become less compliant? Not necessarily.

In the U.S., many protectionist lobbying groups, politicians, and even the U.S. Congress, would like the general public (and other WTO Members) to believe that China‘s use of antidumping measures in and of themselves fail to comply with WTO rules and procedures. They claim that China, failing to comply with its WTO entry commitments, inappropriately takes antidumping actions to benefit its own economy at the expense of others'. Has China complied with the commitments it made in 2001? This paper does not aim to respond to this question authoritatively. However, in the spirit of unbiased scholarship, readers should consider both sides of the argument. As noted above, the U.S. Congress and others would have us believe that China has not fulfilled its obligations. They often provide very well supported arguments for this contention. However, notwithstanding such opinions, many parties that responded to the U.S.-China Business Council‘s ("USCBC") "USCBC 2007 Member Priority Survey" indicated satisfaction and optimism with respect to China‘s compliance with its WTO commitments and its general policies and development.

Reading the USCBC's survey results, can we assume that U.S. businesses doing business in China generally feel quite satisfied with China‘s policies? Should we believe that China has become compliant with all WTO rules potentially relevant to antidumping and dumping calculations? Absolutely not. Notwithstanding any contentions that China has complied with its WTO entry obligations, scholars and businesspeople alike continue to argue that China‘s laws and policies continue to violate other WTO rules and regulations. Examining China's laws and policies, we also find that remaining problems appear with respect to 'China‘s laws, policies, and practices that deviate from the WTO's national treatment principle, its inadequate protection of intellectual property rights, its insufficiently transparent and regulatory processes, and its opaque development of technical and product standards that may favor local companies.'

While focusing on related issues with respect to antidumping policies and actions, this paper will peripherally aim to suggest that, irrespective of the degree of truth or legitimacy to common accusations of purely protectionist intent underlying China‘s policies, China's policies in fact continue to move steadily closer to full compliance with WTO rules and international norms of free trade, while simultaneously controlling risks to the stability of the Chinese, Asian, and world economies. This paper will also briefly comment on particular protectionist (or, with respect to many methods, one might even argue "stabilizing") policies and methods China continues to use, including the origins of such policies and why they con-tinue to persist.

C. Structure of This Paper

Section II of this paper provides some basic explanation of the definition of "antidumping" in the WTO context, and discusses China‘s situation with respect to antidumping. Section III evaluates China‘s legislation and policies related to antidumping. Section IV provides some commentary regarding antidumping in China, and discusses some of China‘s unrelated policies that could impact the application and applusicability of the WTO antidumping regime in China. Finally, Section V concludes with the author's brief comment on the implications of the ideas expressed in this paper.