Abstract: This article examines the public nature of property law by analyzing the state’s roles in shaping property systems. It argues that, within the ambit of Chinese law, state actors perform four distinct yet interrelated roles: gatekeeper of individual liberty, enabler of economic efficiency, coordinator of social cohesion, and regulator of political dynamics. By elucidating these roles, the study advances discourse on the “publicness” of property law, transcending the established consensus to construct a more nuanced framework for understanding how state power operates through private legal institutions. Engaging with law-and-economics literature and the foundational work of Douglass North, this article makes two contributions. Theoretically, it adopts a multi-faceted model of the state. Empirically, it mitigates Western-centric bias in property scholarship by grounding its analysis in the rich and complex realities of the Chinese legal landscape. Methodologically, the paper employs combined thematic analysis and case studies. For each state role, the article utilizes a tripartite framework. First, it articulates the role's conceptual premise; second, it explores theoretical underpinnings drawn from Hobbes, Locke, Olson, Ostrom, and Kant; and finally, it examines specific legal mechanisms, including rules of accession, the commons, residence rights, and rural collective land rights. Ultimately, the article concludes that property law is not a static repository of private rights, but a dynamic, hybrid construct balancing freedom, efficiency, social harmony, and political order. This framework not only elucidates the complex reality of property law in China but also provides a robust analytical tool for comparative studies of property regimes globally.